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THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM?: DUE PROCESS
GUARANTEES FOR CALIFORNIA
PAROLEES AND PROBATIONERS
Traditionally the judiciary throughout the United States has preferred to maintain a "hands-off" approach in both parole and probation revocation proceedings.' In the last decade, however, there has
been a discernible trend toward a recognition of due process rights
as constitutionally mandated for persons previously adjudged guilty
by the courts. "It is obvious that while the basic notion of due process remains the same, the area encompassed by the concept has expanded considerably in the last few years." 2 This expansion in parole
and probation revocation has swept up both the federal and the state

courts in its wake. In California the landmark case is People v. Vickers,3 which held that post-conviction rights included the right to counsel
and which applied due process guarantees to parolees and probationers
alike.
This note will discuss first the distinction between parole and
probation. Second, it will examine the position of parolees and pro-

bationers in the federal court system, the rationales upon which the
courts had previously based their refusal to extend due process rights

into the post-conviction area, and the eventual rejection of these
theories in favor of a set of federal due process guidelines.

Third,

the history of parole-probation due process rights in California will be
traced, including the recent extensions of these rights in People v.
1. Judge Potter Stewart remarked, "'It is an anomaly that a judicial system
which has developed so scrupulous a concern for the protection of a criminal defendant
throughout every stage of the proceedings against him should have so neglected this
most important dimension of fundamental justice [that of sentencing and corrections].'" Quoted in Clark, Sentencing and Corrections, 5 U.S.F.L. REv. 1 (1970). See
also Dorado v. Kerr, 454 F.2d 892, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1972) (counsel denied for sentencing or parole revocation or eligibility hearings); F. Cohen, A Comment on Morrissey v. Brewer: Due Process and Parole Revocation, 8 C iM. L. BULL. 616, 619 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as 8 CRiM. L. BULL.]; Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prissoners' Need for Legal Services in the Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 U. KANs. L.
REv. 493, 495 (1970); Comment, Right Versus Results: Quo Vadis Due Process for
Parolees, 1 PAc. L.J. 321 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1 PAc. L.J.]; Note, The California Adult Authority-Administrative Sentencing and the Parole Decision as a Problem
in Administrative Discretion, 5 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 360, 368 n.48 (1972).
2. People v. Youngs, 23 Cal. App. 3d 180, 184, 99 Cal. Rptr. 901, 904 (1972).
3. 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1972).
[602]
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Vickers,4 People v. Nelson,5 and In re Prewitt.6 Fourth, the still unresolved issues of the constitutional right to counsel and the application of due process rights to disciplinary proceedings and eligibility hearings will be discussed; possible arguments in favor of extending
the due process guarantees to parolees, probationers, and perhaps prisoners themselves will be suggested and evaluated. Finally, an analysis of the trends in the present case law culminating in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli and In re Law8 will be made in order to determine the

direction in which future decisions will move.
Background in the Federal Courts
The Distinction Between Parole and Probation

The distinction between parole and probation is primarily one of
procedure, rather than one of substance. 9 Probation, which is granted
by the trial judge, is a judicial function; parole, on the other hand, is at
the discretion of the Adult Authority and is given only after the service of part of the sentence. 10 This separation of powers, judicial
from administrative, has been greatly overemphasized in the past, for
the results of the two procedures are substantially the same. 1 Both
parole and probation are aimed at rehabilitation of the convict, at
economy for the government, and thus at benefit for society. 2 Both
depend upon a determination that the convicted person can now safely
rejoin the society whose rules he has broken with a good chance of

assimilation.

Both rely upon conditions of supervision for release

3

4. Id.
5. 8 Cal. 3d 463, 503 P.2d 1322, 105 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
6. 8 Cal. 3d 470, 503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972).
7. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
8. 10 Cal. 3d 21, 513 P.2d 621, 109 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1973).
9. For a discussion of the California viewpoint on the. distinction between parole
and probation, see text accompanying notes 102-111 infra.
10. The distinction between parole and probation is more thoroughly treated in
W. Cohen, Due Process, Equal Protection and State Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42
U. COLO. L. Rnv. 197, 225-26 (1970) [hereinafter cited as W. Cohen]; Van Dyke,
Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CALM. L. Rav.
1215, 1239 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Van Dyke]; Note, An Endorsement of Due
Process Reform in Parole Revocation: Morrissey v. Brewer, 6 LOYOLA L. REv. (Los
ANGELE S) 157, 166 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 6 LOYOLA L. REv. (Los ANGELES)].
Compare CAL. PEN. CODE § 3041 (West Supp. 1973) (parole), with CAL. PEN. CODE

§ 1203 (West Supp. 1973) (probation).
11. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.3 (1973); see J. CANNON, F. DaVINE, J. PERAZIcH, L. SCHWARTZ & P. TRUBNER, LAw AND TAcTIcs IN SENTENCING

117 n.58 (1970); W. Cohen, supra note 10, at 219; 6 LOYOLA L. REv. (Los ANGELES),
supra note 10, at 167.
12. CALF RN
BD. OF CORREcTIONs, Probation, COORDINATED CALOIFONIA CoRRECTONS: FE. SERvicEs: PROBATION, PAROLE 18-20 (1971); id., Parole at 7, 12-14.
13.

See CALiFoRNA LFGISLATURE ASSEMBLY

INTERIM COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

and upon possible revocation to assure the success of the programs.
Even though the similarity of the two procedures is substantial, only
recently has the specious
distinction been abandoned, and then primarily
14
in the state courts.
Theoretical Bases for Denying Post-Conviction Due Process Rights
Until about five years ago the law presented a generally bleak
picture to the parolee or probationer seeking to obtain procedural due
process rights in revocation hearings. Confusion and differing theories for denying relief, 15 as well as reluctance to extend constitutional
guarantees, meant that many individuals were forgotten by the courts
following conviction. While the protections afforded to the accused in a
criminal proceeding were enlarged, the post-conviction area remained
virtually untouched by direct judicial decision. This section will examine some of the principal rationales by which the courts justified
their refusal to extend due process rights to post-conviction procedures.16
The Right-Privilege Theory
Escoe v. Zerbst,' 7 one of the early United States Supreme Court
cases dealing with the limited liberty of the convict, voided a probation revocation because the procedure employed failed to comply with
a federal statute requiring a hearing. However, the constitutional
right to such a hearing was specifically denied.' 8 Rather, Justice
(1969) for sample parole conditions and
a brief summary of the procedures used in revoking parole.
14. See text accompanying note 111 in ra.
15. F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CORRECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR MANPOWER AND TRAINING 28-35 (1969) [hereinafter cited as F. COHEN].
16. Not all commentators agree on the number or designation of these conflicting
theories, although most of the writers agree in substance. Fred Cohen limits his theories
to three and refers to them as "privilege, contract, and continuing custody." F. COHEN,
supra note 15, at 31-34. Van Dyke, on the other hand, lists five reasons for refusing
due process protections: the right-privilege distinction, parens patriae, constructive custody, the distinction between administrative and judicial tribunals, and waiver. Van
Dyke, supra note 10, at 1243-54. A student author notes six such theories, adding
"comity" to and substituting "contractual relationship" for "waiver" in those cited by
PROCEDURE, PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEDURES

Van Dyke. Note, Conditional Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 U. PITT. L.

REv. 638, 639-46 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 33 U. PITT. L. REV.]. William Cohen uses
the right-privilege distinction, the constructive custody theory, the civil-criminal distinction, and the contract theory. W. Cohen, supra note 10, at 206-15. Other student writers discuss four theories: parens patriae,the right-privilege distinction, the theory of constructive custody, and contract. 1 PAC. L.J., supra note 1, at 330; Comment, Parole
Revocation Hearings-ProJusticia or Pro Camera Stellata?, 10 SANTA CLARA LAw. 319,
330-32 (1970).
17. 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
18.

Id. at 492.

February 1974J DUE PROCESS FOR PAROLEES & PROBATIONERS

605

Cardozo stated in dicta: "Probation or suspension of sentence comes
as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with
such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose."1 9
The well-recognized implication, and the thought emphasized by later
courts, was that the probationer possessed a privilege, not a right,
with regard to his liberty. Almost thirty years before Escoe, parole
had been similarly described.2 0 The distinction between privilege and
right 21 was one of the theories used to defeat proponents of postconviction due process guarantees; it was reasoned that parole and probation were conditional grants given through the kindness of the state,
which could be forfeited at the state's discretion.2 2
Although modem courts have been reluctant to rule that the
right-privilege distinction was a mere fiction created by the judiciary
of the past, the importance of the theory in due process questions was
finally exploded by Hahn v. Burke.23 While the opinion noted that
probation was a privilege, the court went on to say that "essential procedural due process no longer turns on the distinction between a privilege and a right."2 Both Goldberg v. Kelly25 and Cafeteria& Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy 6 also held that the constitutional challenge
alleging a denial of due process protections could not be answered by
repetition of the worn right-privilege distinction. As Professor Fred
Cohen correctly observed,
A fundamental problem with this theory is that probation is now
the most frequent penal disposition just as release on parole is the
most frequent form of release from an institution. They bear27little
resemblance to episodic acts of mercy by a forgiving sovereign.
Thus, the right-privilege theory, based upon the idea of state benevo19. Id. at 492-93. Other dictum in Escoe suggested that a probation revocation
hearing at which the accused could speak would improve the probation system and
avoid unfair dealing. Id. at 493-94. This was not, however, constitutionally required,
and, in fact, this part of the opinion was ignored in subsequent judicial rulings. As
one commentator observed, "However much the Supreme Court might have felt that
the proper administration of a rehabilitative program required due process, it could not
extend due process rights in such cases, since only minimal due process was accorded
to defendants in pre-conviction proceedings until the 1960's." 1 PAc. L.J, supra note
1, at 332-33 (emphasis added).
20. Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908).
21. For a discussion of the growth and gradual demise of the right-privilege distinction, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 H.nv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
22. See W. Cohen, supra note 10, at 206-07.
23. 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970).
24. Id. at 103; see Note, California and Federal Administrative Due Process:
Development, Interrelation and Direction, 5 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1, 33-35 (1972).
25. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
26. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
27. F. COHEN, supra note 15, at 32.
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lence in granting probation or parole, is no longer accepted as a rationale for denying due process rights in post-conviction proceedings.
The Contract Theory
Emphasis upon the beneficence of the state also appeared in
the contract theory of revocation. Since the granting of conditional
release to the convict was a state's prerogative, the state could and
did demand that the individual consent to the conditions it imposed.2 8
The prisoner's agreement was formalized by his signing of the document stipulating to those conditions. However, an acceptance was
also theorized whenever the prisoner took advantage of the opportunity for freedom, with or without the formal signature.29 The contract was completed by this "acceptance," and any breach by the
former prisoner would be material enough to allow the state to rescind the contract and revoke the liberty.
The contractual theory died even faster than the right-privilege
distinction."0 The unconscionability of a contract between parties
with unequal bargaining power, such as the state and the convict, was
recognized; 31 and once the contract was no longer considered valid,
it became impossible to justify rescission of the conditional freedom on
breach of contract grounds. 2
The ParensPatriaeTheory
Some opponents of post-conviction due process argued, again in
the name of benevolence, that the parole board was merely acting as
parens patriae to the released man. This theory rested on the assumption that the goals of both the parole board and the parolee or
28.

The theory of consent is said to have originated in United States v. Wilson,

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833). Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 638, 642-43, 645-46 (1966); see W. Cohen, supra
note 10, at 207; 33 U. PTT. L. REv., supra note 16, at 639. California Penal Code
section 3053 (West 1970) allows the Adult Authority to impose on the parolee whatever conditions it deems proper, while California Penal Code section 1203.1 (West

1970) authorizes the court to stipulate reasonable restrictions as conditions for probation. Recent case law indicates that these probation conditions must bear some relationship to the crime committed and must be reasonably aimed at preventing future
criminality. E.g., People v. Keefer, 35 Cal. App. 3d 156, 168-69, 110 Cal. Rptr. 597,
605-06 (1973).
29. See Note, Parole: Rights and Revocation, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 550, 553
(1971); 33 U. PrrT. L. REv., supra note 16, at 645.

30. See Van Dyke, supra note 10, at 1244. Although Van Dyke refers to "the
waiver theory," it is similar to the contract theory referred to in this note.
31. See Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1970): "Probation is in
fact not a contract. The probationer does not enter into the agreement on an equal
status with the state."
32. See W. Cohen, supra note 10, at 207; cf. F. COHEN, supra note 15, at 32-33.
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probationer were identical-the return of the convicted person to a rehabilitated life within society. Under this view, the revocation proceedings
were not considered to be criminal in nature, nor was the state to be
regarded as an adversary;33 these proceedings were merely administrative and were in the best interest of the accused. Thus, it was argued that
the procedural safeguards which were slowly being introduced into
criminal proceedings3 4 had no place in the revocation setting.3 5
The theory of a nonadversarial revocation was closely akin to
that used in juvenile hearings, in which the state had also proceeded
in parens patriae. When In re Gault3" rejected this reasoning in the
case of a juvenile, the United States Supreme Court removed one of

the foundation stones for denial of due process to the parolee and probationer.

Even before the discrediting of the theory by Gault,3 7 the

Supreme Court had stated, "[he admonition to function in a
'parental' relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness."' 8I
In light of this admonition and the holding in Gault, it seems obvious

that parens patriae is no longer a viable excuse for depriving an adult
offender of his due process safeguards. Certainly the parens patriae
theory, the idea of the helpful parental relationship, is less persuasive
in the case of the adult offender than in the case of the juvenile, where
it has already been laid to rest.
The Constructive Custody Theory

Just as the parens patriae theory viewed the parolee or probationer basically as a ward of the state, the constructive custody theory 9
was based upon the premise that the released man was not really at
33. See Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 GEo. LJ. 705, 71922 (1968).
34. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to appointed
counsel on appeal); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to appointed
counsel).
35. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 239-40 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The court also held
that compulsory process was not constitutionally required.
36. 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967): "The Latin phrase [parens patriae] proved to be
a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the
constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance."
37. "IT]he essence of Gault is that even in the most classic of the parens patriae relationships-that of state and child--certain procedural safeguards heretofore associated with strictly adversary proceedings are constitutionally required." Van Dyke,
supra note 10, at 1247. In the area of juvenile justice, state protectiveness of the individual had been an accepted theory before the case of In re Gault was handed down.
38. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966), cited in In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
39. For a more complete presentation, see Comment, Parole: A Critique of Its
Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 702, 711-20 (1963); 33 U. PnrT.
L. REv., supra note 16, at 645.
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liberty at all. He was merely serving his sentence within invisible
prison walls which surrounded him even as he moved through free
society.40 This theory presupposed that the parolee or probationer was
actually under the custodial care of the state and that his imprisonment
had merely taken a different form. Through this logic it was possible to argue that revocation involved a mere change in the type of
incarceration, 41 a procedure which would certainly not entitle the prisoner to constitutional guarantees equal to those before his conviction.4 2
The idea that "custody" undermined due process rights was substantially destroyed in the late 1960's by Specht v. Patterson43 and
other lower federal court decisions.4 4 The goal of these cases was to
provide safeguards following conviction for criminal offenses. The
Specht case4 5 granted the prisoner the right to counsel and to a hearing before imposing an additional sentence for an alleged violation of
a different statute than the one under which the defendant had been
convicted.4 6 Despite the fact that the convict was already within the
physical custody of the state, the Court forbade additional incarceration, based upon a different statute than that relied upon at trial, without prior procedural protections. In a First Circuit case,4 7 transfer
of an inmate from a training center to a correctional center also was prohibited unless the prisoner had received a hearing with counsel present. Obviously, the notion that procedural due process can be denied
on the basis of constructive custody finally was recognized as a fallacy.
Throughout the decades of the twentieth century the federal
court system thus had built a series of legal fictions to support the
denial of due process rights to parolees and probationers. Since the
Supreme Court had not yet begun to grant extensive due process protections within the context of the criminal trial, it is not surprising that
the judiciary hestitated in providing those same protections to men who
had already been convicted. But slowly the courts struck down each
40. See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923).
Although the Court
noted that parole was a type of imprisonment, nevertheless, this case held that, once
parole was revoked, the prisoner had to serve his entire sentence without credit for
the time which he had spent on parole. Therefore, a parolee is actually serving his
sentence only if his parole is not revoked. Id. This type of logic indicates the fallacious nature of the constructive custody theory.
41. Id.
42. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
43. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
44. Van Dyke, supra note 10, at 1248-49; see, e.g., Shone v. Maine, 406 F.2d
844 (1st Cir.), vacated as moot, 396 U.S. 6 (1969).
45. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
46. The Court also held that there was a right to confront witnesses, to cross

examine, to give evidence, and to have findings made. Id. at 610.
47. Shone v. Maine, 406 F.2d 844 (lst Cir. 1969).
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of the blocks upon which post-conviction denials of rights had been
built. The 1960's brought a sudden increase in judicial recognition of
the constitutional rights of both the accused and the convict; the evolution from a very few rights to substantial due process guarantees had
begun.
The Granting of Due Process Rights Since the Late 1960's
Mempa v. Rhay and Expansions in the Civil Law
In Mempa v. Rhay48 the Supreme Court finally held that probation revocation, when it was combined with sentencing, was a part
of the criminal proceeding, thus making at least one type of revocation action subject to due process protections for the probationer. 49
Justice Marshall wrote: "[A] lawyer must be afforded at this proceeding whether it be labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred
sentencing." 50 But lower court response to the Mempa ruling was
confused and uncertain. 51 Some federal jurisdictions applied the
Mempa holding broadly; they equated probation with parole and extended procedural safeguards to both types of revocation. 52 Other
circuits chose to limit the decision to its facts and then only apply it when
the probationer was subject to a newly imposed sentence."
At the same time that Mempa was opening the door to due process guarantees in the post-conviction area, the Supreme Court was
also beginning to take a more active role in extending procedural due
process to areas of the civil law. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation5 4 expanded the rights to which a defendant in a civil suit was
entitled before he could be deprived of his property. In that case, the
Supreme Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment5 5 to summary prejudgment remedies and held that a Wisconsin pre-judgment wage
garnishment statute denied the prior notice and hearing which the due
process clause required. 56 Sniadach was followed by Goldberg v.
48. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
49. Id. at 133-37.
50. Id. at 137.
51. See Van Dyke, supra note 10, at 1228-34, for a listing of cases in each federal circuit with regard to Mempa.
52. Id. at 1228-31.
53. Id. at 1231.
54. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
55. Both Sniadach and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), made a point of
the constitutional issue involved in pre-judgment actions. Fuentes, which considered
replevin statutes from a due process viewpoint, stated that "it is clear that the ...
possessory interests... were within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
at 84. For a more extensive analysis of Fuentes, see 6 LOYOLA L. Rv. (Los A.NGELES), supra note 10, at 172-73.
56. For a discussion of the application of due process to civil law, see Tobriner,
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Kelly,57 in which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment required the right to a hearing and other procedural safeguards before
welfare payments could be terminated. 58 Finally, in Boddie v. Connecticut5 9 the restriction of procedural guarantees to particular and
limited property interests was abandoned in favor of a more general
application of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan, writing
for the Court, noted that merely because "the hearing required by due
process is subject to waiver, and is not fixed in form does not affect its
root requirement that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest" ' when
such a procedure does not conflict with "a countervailing state interest
of overriding significance."'" These cases 62 "dispelled any lingering
remnants of the theory that procedural due process was only required
when some 'vested right' was being impaired." 63 It was an easy and
rational step for the Supreme Court to shift the emphasis from the protection of general property interests to the security of liberty, particularly since the right-privilege theory supporting a denial of safeguards
to probationers and parolees had now lost much of its importance in
64

both criminal and civil law.

Morrissey v. Brewer
This transitional step took place in the decision of Morrissey v.
Brewer,6 5 which came in the midst of the confusion caused by
Special Introduction to 4A CALIFORNIA FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE ANNOTATED
4-5 (K. Arnold ed. 1971).
57. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
58. The Court, in trying to establish guidelines for the extension of due process
rights, stated: "The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous
loss' .... ." Id. at 262-63. This standard was propounded in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), in which Justice Frankfurter noted
that "the right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind,
even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction,
is a principle basic to our society." Id. at 168 (concurring opinion).
59. 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigents unable to pay court fees have right to divorce).
60. Id. at 378-79 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 377.
62. Accord, Randone v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr.
709 (1971) (attachment of alleged debtor's necessities prior to hearing not allowed).
63. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 779 (N.D. Cal. 1971), citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1969).
64. See text accompanying notes 17-27 supra.
65. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). For a critical evaluation of Morrissey, see Young,
Supreme Court Reports: Parolee Entitled to Hearing Before Revocation of Parole, 58
A.B.A.J. 1099 (1972); 8 CalM. L. BULL., supra note 1; Note, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 95-103 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 86 HARv. L. REv.];
50 J. URBAN L. 528 (1973).
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Mempa and extended the rights granted in civil cases to those in
criminal post-conviction proceedings. The United States Supreme
Court was faced squarely with the constitutional issue of whether the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that an
individual be provided with the opportunity to be heard prior to the
revocation of his parole. However, the Court did not limit its inquiry
strictly to the question of the right to a hearing, but went on to consider and establish specific minimum procedures which are necessary to
fulfill the due process requirements in the corrections field. The
framework for a full, if informal, hearing resulted.
Morrissey v. Brewer heralded a new era in the correctional field.
Unlike the Mempa decision, which held that probation revocation and
deferred sentencing when taken together were part of a criminal action,6 6 the Morrissey court concluded that parole revocation was not
a part of the criminal proceedings envisaged by the Fourteenth Amendment;6 7 therefore, "the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such
a proceeding [did] not apply to parole revocations. '68 But Morrissey
did consider and finally dismiss the four theories that had served as a
basis for the denial of due process. 69 Parole was not to be viewed as a
privilege or a right, but as a freedom, "although indeterminate," which
included "many of the core values of unqualified liberty" whose termination implied "grievous loss" for the individual.7 6 Even conditional
liberty was held to be within the Fourteenth Amendment protections.
The state's interest in revoking the parole of an offender had to be
balanced with the individual's interest in his freedom. 71 The Court
concluded that an informal hearing would meet the needs of both interests without hardships on either one.
Due process requirements, as* propounded by the majority in
Morrissey, were to be fulfilled in two stages. The first stage was seen
as a "preliminary" hearing to determine whether probable cause
existed to believe that the accused was indeed a parole violator.72 A
second hearing, to consider the actual revocation, was to be held within
a reasonable time. 73 Both of these proceedings were to be governed
by six basic and "minimum" requirements of due process, to which the
66. See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra.
67. 408 U.S. at 480, cited with approval in Gagnon v. Scarpeli, 411 U.S. 778,
782 (1973).
68. 408 U.S. at 480.
69. Id. at 480-84 (by implication); 86 HARv. L. Rv., supra note 65, at 96 &
n.7. See text accompanying notes 15-47 supra.
70. 408 U.S. at 482.
71. Id. at 483-84.
72.

Id. at 485.

73.

Id. at 487-88.
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states might add their own procedural ideas. The six requirements
were:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure
to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be
heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for
not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing
body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need
not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by
the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.7The emphasis of the Court was on flexibility and informality; reason75
ableness was to reign in future correctional actions.

Due Process in California
Background
In the pre-Morrissey days, California state courts, like federal
courts, employed the four theories which were used to justify a denial
of due process rights. 76 The holding in In re Martinez,7 7 a parole
revocation case, was founded upon three of these arguments78 and
proved that, as late as 1969, the California courts maintained the attitude that "[p]arole and rights related thereto are creatures of statute,
not of constitutional directive."
Past application of the four theories
by California courts was not a rarity,8 ° nor was the resulting denial of
74.
75.

Id. at 489.
See 8 CRIM. L. BULL., supra note 1, at 619.

The possible ramifications of

this aspect of the Morrissey opinion are discussed critically in an article by California
Supreme Court Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner and Harold Cohen in volume 25, issue 4,
of the Hastings Law Journal.
76. See text accompanying notes 17-47 supra. Although the application of the
contract theory, per se, in California, has been questioned, certainly the existence of
a contract has been inferred by the courts. Comment, Parole Revocation HearingsPro Justicia or Pro Camera Stellata?; 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 319, 330-31 & n.85 (1970).
77. 79 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1969), vacated, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr.
382 (1970).
78. 79 Cal. Rptr. at 688-92.
79. Id. at 688.
80. E.g., In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 425 P.2d 200, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600
(1967) (contract theory and right-privilege theory); In re Peterson, 14 Cal. 2d 82, 92
P.2d 890 (1939) (contract theory); In re Rosencrantz, 205 Cal. 534, 271 P. 902 (1928)
(right-privilege theory); People v. West, 253 Cal. App. 2d 348, 61 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1967)
(constructive custody theory); People v. Quilon, 245 Cal. App. 2d 624, 54 Cal. Rptr.
294 (1966) (constructive custody theory); People v. Ray, 181 Cal. App. 2d 64, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1960) (right-privilege theory); People v. Contreras, 154 Cal. App. 2d 321,
315 P.2d 916 (1957) (constructive custody theory); People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App.
2d 499, 297 P.2d 451 (1956) (parens patriae and constructive custody theories); In
re Dearo, 96 Cal. App. 2d 141, 214 P.2d 585 (1950) (right-privilege theory).
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post-conviction due process protections founded upon these theories.81
In People v. Leach8 2 the court defined probation in terms which clearly

indicated a reliance upon the right-privilege distinction. Probation was
seen as "an act of grace and clemency, which may be granted by the
court to a seemingly deserving defendant, whereby he may escape
the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of

which he stands convicted.

'83

Even in 1972 a California court found

that it was relevant to discuss the right-privilege distinction. 84 Thus, the
California courts steadfastly maintained the viewpoint that there was no

constitutionals right to a hearing prior to parole or probation revocation. 8

In general, the more recent holdings of the California courts

have coincided with their federal counterparts. In People v. Youngs,87
the state court complied with the ruling in Mempa v. Rhays8 by hold-

ing that a probationer upon whom sentence had not been passed was
entitled to the right to counsel, the right to present witnesses, and the
right to a hearing before final sentence could be passed following the

summary revocation of his probation.

However, the Youngs court

extended itself beyond the federal position in one area by indicating

that probation granted before sentencing and probation granted after a
suspended sentence appeared to be nearly identical. 9 While this
concept laid the foundation for the unprecedented holding in People

v. Vickers, ° the dictum expressed by the Youngs court was not bind81. See, e.g., In re Solis, 274 Cal. App. 2d 344, 78 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1969).
82. 22 Cal. App. 2d 525, 71 P.2d 594 (1937).
83. Id. at 527, 71 P.2d at 595, quoting People v. Hainline, 219 Cal. 532, 534,
28 P.2d 16, 17 (1933).
84. In re Thomas, 27 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36, 103 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570 (1972).
Thomas noted that the right-privilege distinction was effectively overruled by the United
States Supreme Court in the Morrissey case; however examination by the California
court did indicate that the Morrissey idea was not yet a firmly established one.
Id., citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
85. It would also appear that the California courts did not effectively enforce
the statutory right to a hearing prior to revocation either. According to California Penal Code section 3063 (West 1970) the Adult Authority must show "cause" in order
to revoke or suspend parole, but, until recently, the Authority determined cause with
little challenge from the judiciary or the parolee himself, except in cases of an abuse
of discretion. See 1 PAc. L.J, supra note 1, at 328 n.26. Thus, the legislature of
California granted a statutory safeguard which was one in name only; no real protection
in terms of a guaranteed hearing was effected by the statute itself. In re Levi, 39
Cal. 2d 41, 44, 244 P.2d 403, 404 (1952).
86. E.g., in re Levi, 39 Cal. 2d 41, 244 P.2d 403 (1952); In re Davis, 37 Cal.
2d 872, 236 P.2d 579 (1951); see 29 CAL. Jun. 2d Judgments § 365 (1956) for a full
discussion of California probation revocation procedure.
87. 23 Cal. App. 3d 180, 99 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1972).
88. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
89. 23 Cal. App. 3d at 188, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
90. 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1972).
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ing in abolishing the distinction between the two; it was only a mere
foreshadowing of what was to come. What is more, the majority in
In re Tucker 9 had previously specifically declined to apply the
Mempa holding concerning probation to parole revocation proceedings.
California Law Since December 1972
On December 14, 1972, the California Supreme Court handed
down three companion decisions which radically altered the previous
state of California law, 92 which drew California into line with recent
federal decisions, and which broke new ground beyond that of the
Morrissey holding in the area of post-conviction due process.
People v. Vickers
The first and most important of these three cases was People v.
Vickers." In October of 1970 the defendant was convicted of possession
of heroin, was sentenced following his guilty plea, and was granted
probation upon condition that the defendant serve one year in the
county jail. After he had been on probation for one month and was
working on furlough outside the jail, the defendant allegedly violated
his probation. On the day of the possible violation, the defendant reported ill, was treated at an emergency hospital, and was discharged.
When he did not respond to a call from his probation officer, the
officer obtained a bench warrant on the assumption that the defendant had "absconded."
When the defendant returned to his job, he was taken into custody with a large amount of money in his possession. He claimed that
the money came from the collection of rents for his grandfather. At
the revocation hearing, counsel for the defendant attempted to explain
the circumstances of the defendant's alleged violation, but the court,
without taking testimony from witnesses, revoked the defendant's probation. On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the judgment
was affirmed, on the ground that the Morrissey case was not to be
94
applied retroactively.
The affirmation of the lower court decision is deceiving, how91. 5 Cal. 3d 171, 177-78, 486 P.2d 657, 659-60, 95 Cal. Rptr. 761, 763-64
(1971).
92. California Penal Code section 3060 (West 1970), which allowed revocation
of parole without notice or hearing, and California Penal Code sections 1203.2 (West
Supp. 1973) and 1203.3 (West 1970), which were silent on the question, no longer
apply. They have been superseded by the Vickers decision. As yet, the legislature
has not brought these statutory provisions into line.
93. 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1972).
94. Id.
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ever;' Vickers was much more than a rubber stamp. The court specifically adopted the minimum due process safeguards established by
Morrissey95 for both parole and probation revocation proceedings,9"
and then added the right to counsel. 97 Chief Justice Wright stated
in Vickers:

Although we do not reach the issue whether representation by
counsel is constitutionally compelled at probation revocation pro-

ceedings of the type involved in the instant case, we are of the
view . . . that the efficient administration of justice requires that
the defendant be assisted by retained or appointed counsel at all

revocation proceedings other than at summary proceedings had
while the probationer remains at liberty after absconding. 98

The court reasoned that violations were often technical in nature and

might have been committed without intent by the accused or without
his knowledge. The "degree" and "quality" of the violation would
undoubtedly affect the outcome of the proceedings, but the court recognized that an offender is usually unequipped to cope with the heavy
responsibility of presenting his own case in a clear, concise, and persuasive manner. Trained counsel, the court observed, would aid in

achieving "an orderly, just conclusion."99 This new judicial rule of

procedure, which replaced Penal Code section 1203.2,100 was to apply
both to formal revocation hearings and to hearings which would fol95. In adopting the Morrissey decision, the Vickers court quoted with approval
those parts of the Morrissey opinion which laid the four theories previously mentioned
to rest. 8 Cal. 3d at 455-58, 503 P.2d at 1317-19, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 309-11.
96. Morrissey was concerned with parole only. See text accompanying notes 6575 supra.
97. See Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 306 (1972) for a listing of California cases on the
right to counsel at probation revocation hearings.
98. 8 Cal. 3d at 461, 503 P.2d at 1321, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (emphasis added).
See text accompanying notes 135-163 infra.
99. 8 Cal. 3d at 461, 503 P.2d at 1321, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
100. Section 1203.2 provided for the rearrest of a probationer following alleged violations of the conditions of his release and for the revocation or modification of probation "if the interests of justice so, require," following notice to the probationer and his
probation officer. CAL.PEN. CODE § 1203.2 (West Supp. 1973). The statute, however,
did not afford the probationer the right to a preliminary hearing based upon probable
cause, to written notice, to disclosure of the evidence against him, to the confrontation
of adverse witnesses, to the presentation of supporting evidence and witnesses, and to
an appearance in person before the court. In, these areas the provisions of section
1203.2 failed "to meet several of the mandatory requirements of due process as set
out in Morrissey . . ." (People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d at 459, 503 P.2d at 1319, 105
Cal. Rptr. at 311), and, therefore, did not conform to the Fourteenth Amendment Since
California courts have broadened the rights of a probationer to include many of those
omitted from the statute, the statute itself is now outdated and has been substantially
replaced by this recent case law. See, e.g., People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d
1313, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1972); In re Thomas; 27 Cal. App. 3d 31, 103 Cal. Rptr.
567 (1972); People v. Youngs, 23 Cal. App. 3d 180, 99 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1972).
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low an ex parte revocation in the case of an absconding probationer
who was later taken into custody. 1 1
Although the specific wording of the court applies the new right
to counsel to probationers only, it can be argued that such a right also
extends to parolees.' 0 2 The court, in holding that the due process
guarantees which Morrissey granted to parolees' 0 3 also applied to probationers, noted that it could not "distinguish such proceedings 0in4
principle insofar as the demands of due process are concerned.'1
The opinion continued:
Morrissey is thus equally applicable in the case of a revocation of
probation insofar as it assures that revocation can be had only with
due process protections. However, the precise nature of the proceedings for such revocation need not be identical if they assure
equivalent due process safeguards. 10 5
Thus, it appears that parolees and probationers are entitled to equivalent protection in the eyes of the California Supreme Court. To provide "equivalent" protection without also providing counsel is most
difficult; therefore, it would seem that a strong case can be made for
the extension of the right to counsel to both groups of offenders. 0 6
The argument that the similarities between parole and probation
require an equal right to counsel is even more persuasive in California
101. The Vickers decision cleared up the seeming discrepancy between Morrissey
and Youngs with regard to summary revocation. Morrissey, on the surface, appeared
to prohibit ex parte revocations, but this, the Vickers court suggested, was due to the
Court's assumption that the accused was already in custody. When the offender had
made himself unavailable through escape, then the Youngs doctrine of allowing revocation without the defendant's presence would more logically apply. 8 Cal. 3d at 460,
503 P.2d at 1320, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
102. In fact, the United States Supreme Court accepted this argument in Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), and equated the right of the parolee to counsel
to the similar right of the probationer. Having abolished this distinction, the Court
held that the Constitution did mandate such a right in some revocation hearings. The
decision, however, did not provide counsel to every parolee and probationer; instead,
each petition for counsel was to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, in California an argument for the right to counsel for every parolee and probationer must
be based upon the ruling of the Vickers case in combination with Gagnon. From the
two cases it can be argued that both the California Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court should enlarge the constitutional right to counsel. See text accompanying notes 135-163 infra.
103. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
104. 8 Cal. 3d at 458, 503 P.2d at 1318, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
105. Id. at 458, 503 P.2d at 1319, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
106. It might be contended that although the Vickers court guarantees the same
due process rights to both parolees and probationers, the right to counsel was not
granted as a constitutional one and therefore cannot be extended to both groups. Such
an argument has already been settled by Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973),
which equated the two groups with regard to the right to representation. See note
102 supra.
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than in other state or federal courts. California's indeterminate sentencing law essentially eliminates the distinction between the two revocation procedures by removing all final dispositive powers from the judiciary and by placing control in an administrative body. The indeterminate sentencing process10 7 prohibits the judge from making a final disposition of a case with regard to the exact length of sentence. Rather,
the judge remands the convict to confinement for the term prescribed
by law; the sentence is set later by the Adult Authority, or more often, is not set at all until the prisoner is deemed ready for release.' 08
Discretion is removed from the hands of the court and given to an administrative body. Thus a probationer who violates the terms of
his conditional freedom finds that the judge makes only the initial determination of the probationer's incarceration. Subsequently, his case
is treated in the same manner as that of the parole revokee; he has
the same blot upon his record and is subject to the determinations of
the same administrative groups. Just as the purposes, controls, and
methods for granting probation and parole are similar, 1°9 so are the
considerations for revoking the two types of conditional release. As
Judge Burger aptly pointed out, "[t]he legal proceeding most comparable to revocation of parole is revocation of probation." 110
Therefore, since the administrative procedures used in parole and
probation are essentially the same for both sentencing and revocation,
it would be most untenable to argue that the probationer should have
the right to counsel while the parolee is denied that right. New York
was the first to drop this specious distinction by applying similar due
process rights to the two situations."' Now, with the Vickers ruling
as precedent, California will most probably do the same.
107. California Penal Code section 1168 (West 1970) provides in part that
"[elvery person convicted of a public offense, for which imprisonment in any reformatory or state prison is now prescribed by law shall, unless such convicted person be
placed on probation, a new trial granted, or the imposing of sentence suspended, be
sentenced to be imprisoned in a state prison, but the court in imposing the sentence
shall not fix the term or duration of the period of imprisonment."
Indeterminate sentencing has been praised for removing the wide judicial disparity
in sentencing. Bennett, Foreword to 1. CANNON, F. DEvINE, J.PERAzic-, L. ScHWARTz
& P. TRUEBNER, LAW AND TAcTIcs IN SENTENCING iii (1970). On the other hand,
it has been criticized for extending month-for-month the length of sentence served by
California prisoners, who are not sentenced to a specific term initially. Mitford, Kind
and Usual Punishment in California, 227 THaE ATLANTIc 45, 47 (Mar. 1971). A prisoner was quoted as saying, "Don't give us steak and eggs; get rid of the Adult Authority! Don't put in a shiny modem hospital; free us from the tyranny of the indeterminate sentence!'" Id.
108. Id. at 49.
109. See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
110. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
111. People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 App. Div. 2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600
(1968); see 6 LOYOLA L. REv. (Los ANGELES), supra note 10, at 169. See note 146
Infra.
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People v. Nelson
The second case in the series, and the least important in terms
of granting new procedural rights or clarifying old ones, was People
v. Nelson." 2 The defendant in Nelson pleaded guilty to a charge of
carrying a concealed weapon, but at sentencing the criminal proceedings were suspended and the defendant was placed on probation.
Within a month the defendant was charged with new violations of
the Penal Code. The defendant, accompanied by counsel, claimed
at the hearing that he had committed no violation, but probation was
revoked. On appeal the accused contended that he had not been allowed to present evidence of his innocense at the hearing. The California Supreme Court was thus forced to decide the retroactive application of Youngs and Morrissey, for the defendant's hearing was
prior to either of these decisions. The lower court ruling was affirmed.
With regard to Morrissey, the Nelson court took notice of the
fact that the United States Supreme Court had specifically stipulated
that its decision was prospective only.' 13 "[It was not until Morrissey that the Supreme Court purported to hold for the first time that a
parolee's conditional liberty was entitled to certain due process protections."' " 4 Since the United States Supreme Court itself enunciated
what it considered to be a new requirement, the California Supreme
Court chose not to apply "the usual tests for determining the retroactivity of a novel rule as [the court] would in those instances
where that question is not answered in the written court opinion giving birth to the rule.""' 5 Thus, the Nelson court made it clear that the
Morrissey decision spoke only prospectively.
Determination of the effective date of the Youngs case, however,
required that the court balance three criteria in order to decide where
substantial justice could be found. These factors had been set forth
in In re Tahl:116 "(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the extent of
reliance upon the old rule; and (3) the effect retroactive application
would have upon the administration of justice." 1 7 The Nelson
court held that the first criteria had already been met in practice under
112. 8 Cal. 3d 463, 503 P.2d 1322, 105 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
113. Id. at 465-67, 503 P.2d at 1323-25, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 315-17.
114. Id. at 466, 503 P.2d at 1324, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
115. Id. at 467, 503 P.2d at 1325, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 317. See generally Traynor,
Conflict of Laws in Time: The Sweep of New Rules in Criminal Law, 1967 DuKE L.J.
713 (1967).
116. 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969).
117. 8 Cal. 3d at 467, 503 P.2d at 1325, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 317, quoting In re Tahl,
1 Cal. 3d 122, 134, 460 P.2d 449, 457-58, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 585-86 (1969), quoting
Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 832 (1969).
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Penal Code section 1203.2(e), n 8 since the purpose of Youngs was
to protect the probationer with a hearing following ex parte revocation; therefore, no retroactive application of Youngs would have assisted
the defendant. Concerning the second criteria, the Nelson court noted
that there had been substantial and extensive reliance on previous procedures, which weighed heavily against retroactivity. Thirdly, the
opinion in Nelson suggested that an onerous burden would have been
placed upon the state and upon the administration of justice by such a
retroactive use of the Youngs decision."1 9 For these reasons it was decided that the scales of justice tipped in the direction of prospective
effectiveness only, even though the Mempa case, 20 which had been
the basis for the decision in Youngs, had previously been applied retroactively. 2 ' In fact, the Nelson court recognized the interrelation of
Youngs and Morrissey in due process questions but laid the primary
emphasis upon the latter. Therefore, the holding in Nelson inexplicably made the Youngs decision effective from the same date
as
1 22
that of Morrissey, although Youngs became final six months earlier.
In the course of the discussion of retroactivity, Chief Justice
Wright, referring to Vickers, observed, "Morrissey is to be made applicable to probation as well as parole revocations and . . .proceedings for such revocations must be in compliance with the procedures
mandated by Morrissey.' 23 This statement lends credence to the idea
that California has now abandoned
the unwarranted distinction be24
tween parole and probation.
Thus, Nelson proves significant in two ways: it holds that Morrissey and Youngs are not retroactive, and it again suggests, albeit
in dicta, that parole and probation revocations are to be given equal
status in applying due process protections.
In Re Prewitt
Unlike Nelson and Vickers, the Prewitt2 5 case concerned the
parole rights of a prisoner who had not yet left the confines of the
prison. The defendant was sentenced to serve from six months to
five years for possession of a machine gun. In 1970 the Adult Authority set the term at the maximum but transferred the defendant to
118. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.2(e) (West Supp. 1973).
119. 8 Cal. 3d at 467-68, 503 P.2d at 1325-26, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 317-18.
120. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
121. McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
122. Similar conclusions regarding retroactivity were stated in Vickers. 8 Cal. 3d
at 462, 503 P.2d at 1321-22, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 313-14.
123. 8 Cal.3d at 465, 503 P.2d at 1323, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
124. See text accompanying notes 2-6 & 105-110 supra.
125. In re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d 470, 503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972).
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a forestry camp in preparation for release on parole in five months.
One month before his expected release, the defendant was notified that
parole was denied, that the term remained at five years, and that he
would be given no further parole consideration; these actions were
taken on the basis of investigative reports into the defendant's case.
The court in Prewitt held that "with the exception of the preliminary hearing the requirements of Morrissey are applicable in parole
rescission proceedings . . . "126 as well as in parole revocation cases.
However, retroactive use of the Morrissey decision, for either revocation or rescission cases, was proscribed. Therefore, the Adult Authority's refusal to release the prisoner was allowed under the preMorrissey rule. The question of the Authority's denial of future parole
hearings for the prisoner was answered when the Authority recognized its failure to follow the law handed down in In re Minnis;17 this
case required periodic reconsideration of parole and maximum sentencing orders.
Prewitt's major significance, however, was the extension of the
protection of due process rights beyond parole revocation proceedings.
The court held that there was no substantial difference between the
deprivation of conditional liberty presently being enjoyed, and the deprivation of the fulfillment of a promise of that freedom once granted. 2 ,
Although the logic of the ruling made it possible to argue that due
process protections which applied to revocation and rescission proceedings might also be extended to eligibility hearings, where the possibility of that promise of freedom existed, Chief Justice Wright made
it abundantly clear that the decision was not calling for the application
of the Morrissey procedures to sentencing and eligibility hearings.
Rather, the issue was left open by the Prewitt case,' 21 which merely
stated that in the future "the reviewing court must consider the objectives sought to be achieved by the challenged procedure, the possible unfairness to the prisoner, and the availability of alternative
procedures which are less burdensome to the prisoner."3
Thus,
while general guidelines for a possible broadening of due process
rights were laid down, the Prewitt court refused, for the moment, to
mandate a complete extension into eligibility and sentencing proceedings.
In at least one area, however, the Prewitt decision did indicate
a willingness to recognize further rights for the prisoner, whether he
126.

Id. at 476, 503 P.2d at 1331, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 323.

127.

7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972).

128.
129.
130.

8 Cal. 3d at 474, 503 P.2d at 1330, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
Id. at 475, 503 P.2d at 1330, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
Id., quoting In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 649, 498 P.2d 997, 1004, 102 Cal.

Rptr. 749, 756 (1972).
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faced rescission of parole, possible granting of parole, or the setting of
sentence. Morrissey had ensured an individual's right to question
those witnesses who favored his possible parole revocation, except in
cases in which such confrontation imposed a risk of harm for the informant.'3
Prewitt then held that "[a]t a minimum, and subject to
limitation only when an informant will be exposed to an undue risk of
harm, an inmate [also] should be provided with a copy of any document"' 32 which pertained to his case in order to satisfy due process
requirements. More importantly, in terms of predicting the future direction of this area of the law, the court stated, "It is clear that in
cases of term-fixing and parole-granting the private interest of an
inmate in his liberty outweighs the public interest in preserving confidentiality,"' 33 indicating that a claim that information was revealed
to the prosecution in confidence cannot be made when the duty to disclose was compelled by law.'3 4 Thus, the court in Prewitt was extending some due process rights with regard to notice of the charges
and disclosure of statements by informants to those without even the
conditional liberty of the parolee or probationer, such as the prison
inmate awaiting the granting or denying of parole, or the prisoner anticipating sentencing.
Unanswered Questions
A Constitutional Right To Counsel
While the Morrissey decision and the three California cases' 35
were landmarks in an area previously overlooked and still rather substantially neglected by the judiciary, 3 6 a number of significant questions remain undecided by the courts' pronouncements. Perhaps the
most important and far-reaching of these is whether every parolee or
probationer is constitutionally guaranteed a right to counsel at revocation hearings. As Justice Marshall noted in Mempa v. Rhay, 3 7 the
131. 408 U.S. at 487, 489.
132. 8 Cal. 3d at 476, 503 P.2d at 1331, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 323 (emphasis
added). The Prewitt decision was preceded by In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d
997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972). Minnis held that California Penal Code section
1203.01 (West Supp. 1973) did not violate due process; therefore, an inmate had the
right to receive copies of statements sent by court officials and investigators to the Adult
Authority following pronouncement of judgment. Prewilt made it clear that the prisoner had the constitutionalright to read and respond not only to official statements, but
also to any documents produced by informants.
133. Id.
134.

Id.

135. People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1972);
People v. Nelson, 8 Cal. 3d 463, 503 P.2d 1322, 105 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972); In re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d 470, 503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972).
136.

See note 1 supra.

137.

389 U.S. 128 (1967).
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lawyer's expertise is of great value "in marshaling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and
assisting the defendant to present his case ....

Until recently the general view had been that the right to counsel

was not considered a constitutional right. 1 39 Vickers has assured counsel to an alleged offender through judicial rules of court. But it did
not decide that the federal or state constitutions mandate such a holding;' 40 thus, there is nothing in the Vickers case which would prevent
the retraction of a judicially given right. Only a finding on constitutional grounds would prevent the possible future loss of this basic
right. While a number of legislatures have been willing to grant postconviction counsel rights,'141 the majority of the courts have hesitated
42

to declare that these rights are constitutionally protected.'

138. Id. at 135.
139. Comment, Due Process: The Right to Counsel in Parole Release Hearings,
54 IowA L. REV. 497, 499-502 (1968); see Schawartzberg v. United States Bd. of Parole, 399 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir. 1968); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 238 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1946); In re Schoengarth,
66 Cal. 2d 295, 304, 425 P.2d 200, 206, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600, 606 (1967); Briguglio v.
Board of Parole, 55 Misc. 2d 584, 586, 285 N.Y.S.2d 883, 885 (1968).
140. Falk, Foreword to The Supreme Court of California: 1971-72, 61 CALIF. L.
REv. 273, 277 (1973).
141. In Alabama, the District of Columbia, Florida, Michigan, Montana, Washington, and West Virginia, the parolee may be entitled to representation by counsel. For
the probationer such a right has been legislatively mandated only in Florida, Georgia,
Minnesota, and Tennessee. Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation
Hearings, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 175, 181-82 (1964) (citing specific state statutes).
Since the constitutional right to counsel has not been applied across the board in revocation hearings (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)), statutes, such as these
states have, take on added significance for the practitioner in those states.
Federally, 18 U.S.C.A. section 3006A (1973 Supp.) clearly provides for the appointment of counsel in federal revocation proceedings for those parolees or probationers who are financially unable to obtain their own attorneys. The statute provides:
"(a) Each United States district court . . . shall place in operation . . . a plan for
furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation. . . who is subject to revocation of parole ....
(b) . . . In every criminal case in which the defendant is charged. . . with a violation
of probation and appears without counsel, the United States magistrate or the court
shall advise the defendant that he has the right to be represented by counsel and that
counsel will be appointed to represent him if he is financially unable to obtain counsel.
(c) A person for whom counsel is appointed shall be represented at every stage of
the proceedings from his initial appearance before the United States magistrate or the
court through appeal, including ancillary matters appropriate to the proceedings." Id.
§ 3006A(a)-(c).
142. Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681, 683-84 (10th Cir. 1969).
It is obvious that when the due process right to retain counsel is recognized, the
equal protection clause can be cited to support the constitutionally-compelled companion
right to appointed counsel in the case of financial need. However, such logic does not
solve the basic issue of whether a right to counsel, either appointed or retained, is con-
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The better reasoned rule views the right to counsel as constitu44

tionally mandated.143 Justice Roberts, in Commonwealth v. Tinson,'

commented that the logical extension of the Mempa right to repre-

sentation at a combined sentencing-probation hearing was the granting
of the constitutional right to counsel at a full parole revocation hearing.145 Cases such as People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee' 46 have
held that the due process clauses of their own state constitutions require the assistance of counsel, accompanied by an advising of each
47
accused man of his rights.It has been argued that the silence of the majority in Morrissey

in regard to this right to representation indicated approval of this, as
well as other, limitations upon the rights of the convict.' 48 But sistitutionally required under the due process clause. Id. See text accompanying notes
135-159 supra & infra.
143. See, e.g., People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison,
27 N.Y.2d 376, 383, 267 N.E.2d 238, 240, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449, 454 (1971); People ex
rel. Calloway v. Skinner, 33 N.Y.2d 23, 300 N.E.2d 397, 347 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1973).
Calloway reconsidered Menechino's broad grant of the right to counsel as constitutionally
mandated and retreated slightly and at least temporarily from the apparent trend toward expanded due process rights. However, as in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973), the New York court did continue to recognize a limited right under both the
federal and state constitutions. Additionally, the state constitution was viewed as guaranteeing counsel during final revocation hearings. Thus, although change lessened the
broad due process protections which New York had once granted, the rationale for
these guarantees remains sufficiently viable to be used in arguments for the recognition
of constitutional rights in other states, such as California.
144. 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969).
145. Id. at 332-33, 249 A.2d at 551-52. The Tinson case also noted that there
was a greater need for counsel in the case of a full hearing, such as a parole revocation
proceeding, than in the case of a sentencing hearing, which might often be a mere
formality. Since counsel was granted at the latter, it was obviously required at the
former. Id. at 333, 249 A.2d at 552, citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 428 Pa. 210,
215, 236 A.2d 805, 808 (1968).
146. 29 App. Div, 2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1968). E.g., People ex rel. Warden,
Md. Penitentiary v. Palunbo, 214 Md. 407, 135 A.2d 439 (1957); Commonwealth v.
Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969).
Following a legislative change in the New York law, the precedential value of the
Combs decision was called into question by some New York courts. E.g., People ex
rel. Ochs v. LaVallee, 33 App. Div. 2d 80, 307 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1969). The holding
in Combs, however, also met with approval. People exrreI. Harris v. Mancusi, 32 App.
Div. 2d 873, 302 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1969). For a brief discussion of the conflicting
views regarding the Combs case, see United States ex rel. Egbert v. Warden, House
of Detention for Men, 311 F. Supp. 609, 612 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). A 1971 decision
which supported Combs also updated the material in Egbert and reversed the court's
ruling in Menechino v. Division of Parole, 57 Misc. 2d 865, 293 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1968).
People ex Tel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267
N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
147. 29 App. Div. 2d at 130, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 602. Again, the equal protection
clause would mandate appointed counsel, where retained counsel is allowed or required.
148. 86 HAnv. L. REv., supra note 65, at 103 n.41.
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lence cannot be claimed to be synonymous with approval or disapproval, for courts usually hesitate to consider all but those specific issues which are brought before them.' 49
The opinion by Justice Douglas, dissenting in part in Morrissey,
concerned itself directly with the question of counsel and advocated a
constitutional guarantee of that right. 1 ° Commentators have noted
that Douglas' opinion was worded in the form of a majority opinion,
and it is speculated that this was to have been the opinion of the
Court.' 5 ' Evidently the remaining justices preferred to take a more
conservative approach to post-conviction rights and to delay decisions
on such questions as freedom from pre-hearing detention and the right
to appointed and retained counsel. However, the indication that the
United States Supreme Court had even considered taking a stand in
favor of providing counsel boded well for future decisions on the same
point.
One such recent opinion was handed down by the Supreme
Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 52 which concerned a habeas corpus proceeding by an indigent state prisoner whose probation had been revoked without a hearing and without benefit of counsel. After holding that "a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary
and a final revocation hearing, under . . . Morrissey . . . ,""' the
Court went on to consider the due process right of indigent probationers and parolees to appointed counsel at these hearings. While
refusing to apply "a new inflexible constitutional rule"'' 54 requiring such
counsel in all cases, the Court held that the right to counsel was mandated in at least some cases. In the words of Justice Powell:
[T]he decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a caseby-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for administering the probation
and parole system. Although the presence and participation of
counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain
cases in which fundamental fairness-the touchstone of due process-will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for
indigent probationers or parolees. 155
The particular circumstances in which appointed counsel might
be in order were held to include cases in which the petitioner had
149. Vickers is not silent upon the right to counsel but does fail to reach a decision as to whether or not the right is constitutionally compelled. See text accompanying notes 2-6 & 91-111 supra.
150. 408 U.S. 471, 491-500.
151. Young, supra note 65.
152. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
153. Id. at 782.
154. Id. at 790.
155. Id.
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denied the alleged violation or, if such a violation were uncontested or
already proven, the case in which complex but substantial reasons in
justification or mitigation of the offense existed. Such a petition for
counsel was to be viewed in light of the prisoner's ability to defend himself effectively, and in all cases in which the request for counsel was
denied, reasons for the denial were to be stated in the court record. 156
Thus, Gagnon implied that a constitutional right to counsel for probationers and parolees existed, at least in some cases. 157 When the
Gagnon decision, affirming the constitutional right to counsel for some
parolees and probationers, is compared to the broad Vickers ruling,
which found a judicial right for all, it is possible to argue that the California Supreme Court should recognize a constitutionally protected
guarantee of counsel for both groups in all post-conviction proceed8

ings. 15

In the past the extension of the right to counsel in the post-conviction area was strenuously opposed by those who felt that counsel
for the parolee or probationer would only delay the proper administration of justice and would be economically unsound. 5 9 Joseph Spangler,
Administrative Officer of the Adult Authority, espoused this viewpoint and noted:
Caution should be the password for our all-out "due-process" adherents since all too often legalistic, attorney centered technicalities, in general and overall, can be far more damaging to the public
interest and the parolee client than a well administered, flexible,
and dynamic parole service.1 60
However, this is a poor argument, since the informal hearing envisioned
by Vickers and Morrissey returns much of the control over the proceedings to the Adult Authority;1 61 attorneys would be expected to conform to the standards and rules established by the administrative
body. More importantly, when due process rights are in question,
courts have attempted to select those types of guarantees which will
afford the greatest benefit to the individual with the least burden to
the state;16 2 the process must be one of balancing the benefit and
156. Id. at 790-9 1.
157. California Supreme Court Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner and Harold Cohen discuss the effect of Gagnon on the California Adult Authority in an article to be published in volume 25, issue 4, of the Hastings Law Journal.
158. See note 102 supra & text accompanying notes 102-111 supra.
159. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973). See Note, Dollars and
Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IowA L. REv. 1249 (1970) for an article
on the cost of the right to counsel, which advocates the extension of this right.
160. Spangler, Parole in the West: 1870 - 1970 - 1980, Past, Present and Future,
5 J. CALiF. LAW ENFORCEMENT 166, 177 (1971).
161. In re Law, 10 Cal. 3d 21, 26, 513 P.2d 621, 624, 109 Cal. Rptr. 573, 576
(1973).
162. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Parsons-Lewis, Due Process
in Parole-ReleaseDecisions,60 CAIW. L. REv. 1518, 1546.48 (1972).
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the burden with an eye always on the constitution.' 63 When such a
basic safeguard as the right to counsel is under consideration, it would
seem that the constitutional right must win out, however complicated
the problems of administration may be.
Due Process Rights For Prisoners
Opening the courthouse door to the parolee or the probationer
through the Morrissey and Vickers decisions cannot, of course, be
equated with the access of the incarcerated to this same courthouse.
Although the parolee or probationer may have been rearrested for a
subsequent offense or violation, he has not been deprived of his right
to limited liberty until the final revocation; meanwhile, "his condition
is very different from that of confinement in a prison' 164 in the eyes
of the judiciary. Therefore, the due process rights which have been
afforded to parolees and probationers through recent court decisions do
not necessarily apply to the incarcerated prison inmate. Just how far
constitutional guarantees granted to those on probation and parole will
be extended to convicts is yet another unanswered question.
DisciplinaryProceedings
While the United States Supreme Court has primarily limited its
consideration to parolees and probationers,' 65 other courts have investigated the procedures used by prison officials during disciplinary proceedings.' 6 6 In Clutchette v. Procunier,6 7 a federal court in California
held that due process and equal protection considerations applied to
such Adult Authority actions which might result in solitary or segregated confinement or possible increase in sentence, simply by referral.' 68 Procedural safeguards to be granted included the cross exam163. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
164. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 & n.8 (1972). See note 175 infra.
165. 86 HARV. L. REV., supra note 65, at 101.
166. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971) (successful
challenge to disciplinary system); 86 HARV. L. RaV., supra note 65, at 101 & n.31. For
a discussion of the development of due process safeguards during disciplinary hearings
and the federal cases on this point, see Pearson v. Townsend, 362 F. Supp. 207 (D.S.C.
1973).
167. 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971). See generally Fousekis, Prisoner Mutual
Legal Assistance and Access to the Courts: Recent Developments and Emerging Problems, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1089, 1105 (1972).

168. 328 F. Supp. at 784-85. Within the last decade the judiciary has also indicated a growing awareness of prisoners' complaints in areas such as racial discrimination, discipline, medical care, and standards of cleanliness. See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319
F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd per curiam sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404
U.S. 15 (1971) (prison regulation limiting law books in prison library invalid); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333
(1968) (decided on constitutional grounds) (segregation of prisoners by race violated
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ination of witnesses, an impartial fact finder, and the right to appeal.
Those inmates whose alleged disciplinary infractions could be referred
to the district attorney for future prosecution were also guaranteed the
right to counsel.1 69 Still other courts, which have not extended prisoner rights to so great an extent, nevertheless have given the accused
the right to notice and to respond, while maintaining a vestige of the
former "hands-off" policy.'
Thus, solitary confinement or loss of credit for good behavior
may arguably be as "grievous" a loss to the prisoner as revocation of
parole is to the parolee or revocation of probation is to the probationer,171 and all are equally worthy of judicial protection' 7 through an
application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. An effort to
expand the rights of incarcerated inmates might also rely on the
Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment
and is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
ParoleEligibility Hearings

The applicability of due process rights to eligibility hearings is
also undecided. "[W]hile there has been a significant increase in the
volume and variety of judicial challenges to correctional decisionmaking, the revocation process has undergone far more challenges than

the granting process,"' 74 which typically has remained beyond the judicial pale. It has been contended that revocation involves the depriva-

Fourteenth Amendment); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966)
(condition of prisoner's cell constituted cruel and unusual punishment). See generally
Fousekis, PrisonerMutual Legal Assistance and Access to the Courts: Recent Developments and Emerging Problems, 23 HAsTINGs L.J. 1089 (1972); Goldfarb & Singer, RedressingPrisoners' Grievances,39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 175 (1970).
169. 328 F. Supp. at 783.
170. See, e.g., Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933, 937, 940 (3rd Cir. 1973) (punitive segregation of five days required some due process guarantees); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 196-98 (2d Cir. 1971) (prisoner entitled to due process before punishing for disciplinary infraction); Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1970)
(refusal to mail prisoner's letter to civil liberties union denied him access to court).
171. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 785 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
172. Not all observers agree that disciplinary proceedings are equally worthy of
due process protection. These commentators do point out, however, that the recent
court trend toward application of guarantees in the disciplinary area lends support to the
argument favoring such application in the eligibility hearing setting, which is felt to be
at least as important, if not more so. Parsons-Lewis, Due Process in Parole-Release
Decisions, 60 CArm. L. REv. 1518, 1540-41 & n.113 (1972). See text accompanying
notes 174-79 infra.
173. Note, Recent Applications of the Ban on Cruel and Unusual Punishments:
Judicially Enforced Reform of Nonfederal Penal Institutions, 23 HASTINGs L.J. 1111,
1113-14 nn.12 & 14 (1972).
174. F. CoHEN, supra note 15, at 35, cited in J. CANNON, F. DEVnE, J. PERAZICH,
L. ScnwMaRZ & P. TRuErsNER, LAW AND TACmTCS in SENTENcnrN 117 n.58 (1970).
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tion of conditional liberty upon which the parolee or probationer has
come to rely175 and that the courts attach greater importance "to a
person's justifiable reliance in maintaining his conditional freedom
[absent a violation] than to his mere anticipation or hope of free1 76
dom."
In fact, however, the eligibility hearing is more than a mere hope
of freedom; it even may be contended that the hearing is a type of deferred sentencing. The decision to deny parole means that the prisoner will continue to serve his sentence until the next parole hearing,
while the granting of parole sets a more concrete date, barring violations, for the prisoner's complete freedom. Since sentencing has been
deemed to be a part of the criminal proceeding to which due process
rights are applied, 177 it is logical to extend these rights to an analogous
procedure, the eligibility hearing. 78 What is more, the Prewitt case
suggests that the application of constitutional guarantees to eligibility
hearings will not be long in coming.17 9
A Summary of the Trends in Post-Conviction
Due Process Law
Any prediction of the judicial receptivity to continued expansion
of post-conviction due process rights perhaps can be evaluated best
by reviewing the development of judicial thought in the field. This
section will trace that evolution from its initial "hands-off' approach,

through a period of expansion, to its present state.
175. 8 CRIM. L. BULL., supra note 1, at 621-22; see, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 482 n.8 (1972); United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole,
443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Cleaver, 266 Cal. App. 2d 143, 160, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 20, 31 (1968) (question of constitutional guarantees to freedom left open).
176. United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086
(2d Cir. 1971).
177. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). See text accompanying notes 4850 supra.
178. See Van Dyke, supra note 10, at 1235 n.74, in which the author notes that
such an argument has been rejected by the courts. However, those cases which so
held, as well as Van Dyke's article itself, were written prior to the recent California
case law extending the right to counsel to probation and parole revocation. It would
seem that the argument is once again viable.
At present the California Supreme Court is considering the case of In re Sturm,
Crim. No. 16799, which is concerned with parole release. The petitioner contends that,
at a minimum, due process requires that the Adult Authority furnish a statement of
reasons for denial of his parole. Also at issue are the prisoner's right to counsel in
preparation for and during the eligibility proceeding and the availability of his record
for his scrutiny before such a hearing. The decision in this case may well indicate
how far the California Supreme Court will extend Vickers, Nelson, Prewitt, and Morrissey and in which direction the court is moving. See text accompanying notes 218224 infra.
179. See text accompanying notes 125-130 supra.
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The Hands-Off Approach

Until five years ago the judiciary generally avoided deciding
cases involving due process rights in the parole and probation areas,
particularly with regard to revocation.'
Since the United States
Supreme Court had not yet granted more than minimal guarantees in
pre-conviction proceedings, post-conviction rights were beyond judicial
consideration. In order to justify the denial of these latter rights, the
courts relied upon four theories regarding parole and probation: the
right-privilege theory, the contract theory, the parens patriae theory,
and the constructive custody theory.'
Slowly, each of these theories
was recognized as a fiction and was rejected. 8 2 Thus, justifications for
the hands-off approach are no longer readily available.
The Beginnings of Post-Conviction Rights
As each of the bases for the hands-off approach fell into disfavor, the refusal of the courts to grant post-conviction protection became more untenable. Expansions of rights in the civil law regarding
property,183 and in the criminal law concerning pre-conviction procedures, 8 4 indicated the beginning of an evolution from which substantial post-conviction due process guarantees emerged.
The first steps of the judiciary in this evolution were taken in
Mempa v. Rhay,185 a case involving a combined sentencing-probation
proceeding. Here the Court found that such a sentencing hearing was
a part of the criminal action and that a lawyer for the defendant was
therefore in order. Since the Mempa proceeding was characterized
as a criminal one, the Court did not really deal with post-conviciton
rights directly. However, some lower federal courts took the Mempa
holding as indicative of the new direction in the law and applied due
process criteria to revocation hearings.'18 While California courts were
initially reluctant to extend the Mempa ruling beyond its facts, dictum
in People v. Youngs did foreshadow California's later position regarding rights for those on probation or parole. 8 7
Meanwhile, in Morrissey v. Brewer, s8 the United States Supreme
Court made it clear that these due process safeguards did indeed ap180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See note 1 supra.
See text accompanying notes 15-47 supra.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 54-64 supra.
See note 34 supra.
389 U.S. 128 (1967). See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra.
See note 51 & text accompanying note 52 supra.
See text accompanying notes 87-91 supra.
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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ply in the correctional field."8 9 Although parole revocation was not
held to be a part of the criminal proceeding, Fourteenth Amendment
protections nevertheless were found to be appropriate. The holding
mandated both a preliminary hearing and a revocation hearing, and at
each hearing six minimum due process requirements had to be met. 190
Following the Morrissey case, the trend toward a judiciary more involved
in post-conviction rights was obvious.
The Expansion of Due Process in California Parole
and Probation Revocation
The speed of the evolution of due process protections was greatly
increased in California after the Morrissey case. Not only were the
requirements of Morrissey adopted,' 9 ' but they were expanded to encompass new rights as well as new types of post-conviction proceedings192

People v. Vickers'93 extended the Morrissey guarantees to both
parolees and probationers and, more importantly, held that probationers
were to be represented by counsel at revocation proceedings. The
wording of the opinion indicated that the right to counsel for parolees
also might be successfully argued in the future. 94
The distinction between parole and probation also was abandoned in dictum in People v. Nelson, 9 5 which thus added support
to the Vickers case. In addition, the Nelson decision clearly pointed
out the effective date of the holdings in both Morrissey and Youngs.
More significant than Nelson was In re Prewitt, 96 which extended the protections of due process to the parole rescission situation. This case represented the acknowledgement of limited civil rights
for the prison inmate. Furthermore, the rights to notice of the charges
and to disclosure of statements and documents by informants were
recognized as further expansions of Morrissey. Left open by the Prewitt decision was the question of the possible extension of these safeguards to sentencing and eligibility hearings.
Following the three companion cases of Vickers, Nelson, and
Prewitt, it appeared that the California Supreme Court had entered
into a new period in the granting of post-conviction due process rights,
189. See text accompanying notes 65-75 supra.
190. See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 95, 126 supra.
192. See text accompanying notes 95-134 supra.
193. 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1972).
panying notes 93-111 supra.
194. See text accompanying notes 102-110 supra.
195. 8 Cal. 3d 463, 503 P.2d 1322, 105 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
panying notes 112-124 supra.
196. 8 Cal. 3d 470, 503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972).
panying notes 125-134 supra.

See text accom-

See text accomSee text accom-
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a period which would see the continued expansion of protected rights
and the extension of these protections into other types of proceedings.
Much had been left undecided by the court, but the trend was one of
liberalization and of new-found interest in the treatment of parolees
and probationers. It seemed that the burden on the state increasingly
would be outweighed by the benefit to the individual. 19 7
The Curtailment of Due Process Extension
Whether the extensions which might reasonably have been expected after Vickers, Nelson, and Prewilt will be forthcoming is now
substantially in doubt. Two recent cases, one from the United States
Supreme Court 98 and the other from the California Supreme Court,' 99
seem to indicate reluctance on the part of these courts to continue
what they have started. It appears that the courts are once again narrowing their definition of due process for those caught up in the postconviction process.
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,200 the United States Supreme Court
dealt with the question of the constitutionalright to counsel for parolees
and probationers and held that such a right existed only in a limited
type of revocation hearing. The decision to provide counsel was to be
made on a case-by-case basis and at the discretion of the authority
responsible for corrections. As Justice Powell stated, "[t]he need for
counsel at revocation hearings derives, not from the invariable attributes of those hearings, but rather from the peculiarities of particular
cases." 201 While the Gagnon decision does not affect the California
judicial rule which provides for counsel,20 2 it seems to imply that on a
federal level the future application of due process safeguards to postconviction proceedings will not be made as readily. In addition, the
lack of formal procedures and of rules of evidence at these hearings
was cited by the Court without disapproval, 203 thus indicating that
more rigorous standards in these areas are not now contemplated.
197. See note 162 supra.
198. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
199. In re Law, 10 Cal. 3d 21, 513 P.2d 621, 109 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1973).
200. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). See note 102 supra & text accompanying notes 152158 supra.
201. 411 U.S. at 789.
202. People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1972).
In fact, Gagnon strengthens the argument for a constitutional right to counsel in California. Previously, Vickers held that counsel was required by a judicial rule of the
court and that due process requirements applied to parolees and probationers alike.
Now Gagnon holds that in some cases the Constitution requires counsel. Therefore,
Vickers and Gagnon together can be used to argue for a constitutional right to representation in California. See note 102 supra & text accompanying notes 152-158
supra.

203.

411 U.S. at 789.
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On the state level In re Law204 is the most recent California Supreme Court decision to deal with the post-conviction due process
question. The petitioner was a parolee" 5 who sought release on bail
from a "parole hold" 200 requested by the Adult Authority following
an alleged criminal offense during parole. Although the petition became moot when parole was revoked, the court decided to consider
''2 1
the case because it raised "a question of broad public interest.
Since Morrissey spoke of the " 'arrested' " parolee 20 8 and " 'the parolee's continued detention' ",209 the Law court held that detention
of the parolee without bail was permissible and did not violate due
process requirements.21 0 Furthermore, it was noted that neither the
California Constitution nor any statute "contemplates bail from restraints imposed after the finality of a judgment of conviction." 2 1' In
retreating from an extension of rights through judicial determination,
the court continued:
Thus, to allow bail on the new offense to be grounds for release
of a parolee would constitute an infringement upon a proper exercise of the statutorily declared exclusive jurisdiction of the Authority
in the parole area. ' 12
This is reminiscent of the old hands-off approach" 3 and constitutes
a step back from the liberal attitudes of Vickers, Nelson, and Prewitt.
The Law court also retreated somewhat from the Morrissey criteria of two separate hearings for an accused violator.21 4 The case
204. 10 Cal. 3d 21, 513 P.2d 621, 109 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1973).
205. Although the petitioners in both Gagnon and Law were parolees, it is impossible to argue that the tightening of due process rights will occur in the parole area
alone because parole and probation are substantially the same. See text accompanying
notes 9-14 supra.
206. For a definition of "parole hold" and an explanation of the way in which
the process operates, see In re Law, 10 Cal. 3d 21, 24 n.2, 513 P.2d 621, 623 n.2,
109 Cal. Rptr. 573, 575 n.2 (1973).
207. Id. at 23, 513 P.2d at 622, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
208. 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972), cited in In re Law, 10 Cal. 3d at 25, 513 P.2d
at 623, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
209. 408 U.S. at 487, cited in 10 Cal. 3d at 25, 513 P.2d at 624, 109 Cal. Rptr. at
576 (emphasis omitted).
210. 10 Cal. 3d at 25, 513 P.2d at 624, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
211. Id. at 26, 513 P.2d at 624, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
212. Id.
213. See text accompanying notes 180-182 supra.
214. In California, at the appellate level, there had been a great deal of conflict
before the Law case regarding the necessity for a preliminary pre-revocation hearing
when there had been a prior conviction for the same alleged "violation-offense." In
re Frias, 34 Cal. App. 3d 88, 109 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1973); In re Edge, 33 Cal. App.
3d 149, 108 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1973); In re La Croix, 32 Cal. App. 3d 319, 108 Cal. Rptr.
93 (1973); In re Scott, 32 Cal. App. 3d 124, 108 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1973).
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215
held that a preliminary hearing prior to trial for an alleged felony
satisfied the due process requirement of a preliminary pre-revocation
proceeding, if the Morrissey precepts were followed and if the parolee
had fair notice of the dual purpose of the hearing.2 16 Thus, the parolee
was denied an opportunity to contend, in a local forum, that the finding of the preliminary hearing prior to the felony trial was in error or
that further evidence had arisen since that first proceeding.21 17

Future Trends
Many commentators have speculated on the extent to which
the courts in the future will be willing to extend constitutional rights
to those caught up in the correctional and penal processes. 218 Some
have seen Morrissey, Vickers, and the revocation due process question
as the point at which the judiciary will cease to concern itself 219 and,
more importantly, will refuse to recognize further rights as being constitutionally required. There can be little doubt that the extension of
due process rights beyond Morrissey and Vickers will depend in great
part upon the composition of the courts themselves.2 20
215. The court in Law also discussed the possibility of treating the misdemeanor
trial as a preliminary pre-revocation proceeding. Two difficulties with this substitution
were recognized by the court and included (1) the delay of the trial following arraignment which might fail to conform to the Morrissey requirement for a prompt hearing
and (2) the generally inaccessible trial transcript which would deny an important record of the court's findings to both the parolee and the Authority. Therefore, the misdemeanor trial could only serve a dual purpose following "proper notice or. . . agreement between the parolee and [the] Authority" (10 Cal. 3d at 27, 513 P.2d at 625,
109 Cal. Rptr. at 577.) "in appropriate cases [which were] sufficiently inclusive of
the probable cause hearing procedures mandated by Morrissey ....
Id.
216. 10 Cal. 3d at 27, 513 P.2d at 625, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
217. In re La Croix, 32 Cal. App. 3d 319, 326, 108 Cal. Rptr. 93, 98 (1973).
Although Law gives the Adult Authority the right to conduct a separate preliminary hearing to establish probable cause, the decision to grant such a hearing is at
the Authority's discretion and is not the right of the parolee. 10 Cal. 3d at 27, 513
P.2d at 625, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
218. It has been argued that upon conviction a defendant loses all of his constitutional rights. See Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal
Services in the Criminal-CorrectionalProcess, 18 U. KANs. L. REV. 493, 495 n12
(1970). But it is widely recognized now that the prisoner has not been completely
cut off from the federal and state safeguards, but has merely suffered a limiting of
those guarantees. Id.; see In re Cleaver, 266 Cal. App. 2d 143, 160, 72 Cal. Rptr. 20,
31 (1968). See generally S. RuBIN, H. WEiHOFEN, G. EDWARDs & S. ROSENZWEIG,
THn LAw OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION (1963).
219. 8 Cium. L. BULL., supra note 1, at 621-22.
220. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 646 (E.D. Va. 1971);
Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 784 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Bundy v. Cannon, 328
F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971); People v. Youngs, 23 Cal. App. 3d 180, 184, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 901, 903 (1972); Note, Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Actions,
2 LOYoLA U.L. REv. (CmIcAGo) 110 (1971).
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From the holdings in Gagnon and Law it could be argued that
the judiciary is moving more slowly in the post-conviction due process
field. Rights that had previously been given, such as the right to counsel and the right to two revocation proceedings, are being more clearly
defined, and in the process of definition are being somewhat curtailed.
Other rights which might have been expected (e.g., the right to bail)
have been flatly denied. The fact that courts have dealt with questions not directly before them and have limited extensions through
these decisions 221 indicates that further due process rights will not be
granted in the massive proportions of Morrissey, Vickers, Nelson, and
Prewitt. It is now highly unlikely that courts will replace the probable
cause standard of proof with the reasonable doubt standard, will restrict search and seizure, or will limit the use of arguably inadmissible
evidence. The judiciary seems to have stalled in its forward movement.
Whether that movement will begin to speed up again is conjectural, at least. Certainly, the present curtailment is not absolute.
Even in Gagnon and Law some additional due process rights were
recognized. In Gagnon, for example, there is the recognition, however slight, of a constitutional right to counsel, 222 and in Law notice
to the alleged violator of the dual purpose of hearings is required.22 3
It would seem that the highest courts are now approaching the entire
post-conviction due process questions more slowly, but ability to move
in either direction remains possible.224
221. In re Law, 10 Cal. 3d 21, 23, 26, 513 P.2d 621, 622, 625, 109 Cal. Rptr.
573, 574, 577 (1973).
222. 411 U.S. at 790.
223. 10 Cal. 3d at 27-28, 513 P.2d at 625, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
224. Since In re Law the various districts of the California Courts of Appeal have
continued to interpret Morrissey and the subsequent due process cases; yet, no consistent trend has emerged from these recent appellate holdings. People v. Calais, 36 Cal.
App. 3d 622, - Cal. Rptr. (1974); In re Oglesby, 36 Cal. App. 3d 629, - Cal.
Rptr. - (1974); In re Spence, 36 Cal. App. 3d 636, - Cal. Rptr. - (1974); In re Bell,
36 Cal. App. 3d 643, - Cal. Rptr. - (1974); In re Williams, 36 Cal. App. 3d 649, Cal. Rptr. (1974); Gee v. Brown, 36 Cal. App. 3d 569, Cal. Rptr. (1974);
People v. Dale, 36 Cal. App. 3d 191, - Cal. Rptr. - (1973); In re Boag, 35 Cal. App.
3d 866, 111 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1973); People v. Pinon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 120, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 406 (1973); In re Murillo, 35 Cal. App. 3d 71, 110 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1973);
People v. Dominguez, 35 Cal. App. 3d 18, - Cal. Rptr. (1973); People v. Scott,
34 Cal. App. 3d 702, 110 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
Some cases have extended the
Morrissey rights: the right to a preliminary hearing for an outpatient narcotic addict
subject to recommitment to the California Rehabilitation Center was granted. Other
decisions have interpreted due process rights strictly: prison authorities were permitted
under some circumstances to add to an inmate's disciplinary record without giving
notice. Still other cases have merely applied Gagnon, Morrissey, Vickers, and Law
to the facts in question and have ruled accordingly. It is for the California Supreme
Court to indicate to the lower courts the direction in which the judiciary should move
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Conclusion
For many years the federal courts based their refusal to extend
due process rights to the probationer and the parolee on four theories:
right-privilege, contract, parens patriae, and constructive custody.
These fallacious theories were eventually discarded, and Morrissey v.
Brewer set the tone for and the requirements of the coming reform.
In California, the historical perspective was much the same as in the
federal courts; the four theories met their demise and were replaced by
People v. Vickers, People v. Nelson, and In re Prewitt. As revolutionary as these three cases were, even when considered in light of
Morrissey, certain unanswered questions arose. Was there a constitutional right to counsel? Could due process rights be expanded to
apply to disciplinary and eligibility hearings? These questions are the
material for the future shaping of the law in the post-conviction area.
But such shaping depends upon the evolution of judicial thought.
At the present time the trend in the United States Supreme Court and the
California Supreme Court, as reflected by Gagnon v. Scarpelli and
In re Law, appears to be one of a more gradual definition of due
process guarantees. While it is highly unlikely that a legal system
which has given increasing protection to the individual would suddenly
abandon this position entirely, it is more probable that the rights of
the prisoner, parolee, and probationer will grow much more slowly than
in the recent past.
By Victoria E. Armstrong*
in the future; perhaps the supreme court's ruling in In re Sturm, which should be
handed down before mid-year of 1974, will provide that opportunity. See note 178
supra.
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